Deprecated: mysql_connect(): The mysql extension is deprecated and will be removed in the future: use mysqli or PDO instead in /home/ghanalegal/domains/ghanalegal.com/public_html/engine/Drivers/mysql.php on line 101 OKYERE v. BOYE ADJEI | GhanaLegal - Resources for the legal brains

OKYERE v. BOYE ADJEI


  • New
  • 1961-01-09
  • HIGH COURT
  • GLR 34-43
  • Print

ADUMUA-BOSSMAN, J


Summary

Evidence?-Admissibility of sworn testimony in another suit.Customary law?-Stool property distinguished from stool family property?-Alienation of "communal property".

Headnotes

In 1938 during the term of office of one Yeboa Korie, the Ayokohene, certain land situate at Koforidua, property of the Ayoko stool, was sold to the defendant in order, apparently, to raise money to meet the cost of a litigation which the Ayoko stool had fought and lost. The document of transfer was signed by the said Yeboa Korie as Ayokohene, Krontihene Opanyin Kofi Teng's representative, Kofi Apoakwah, Akonfodihene, Okyeame Kwadjo Akuokos and five other elders. Two principal elders, Bruku and Kwabena Beng did not sign the document. In 1958, the plaintiff then occupying the Ayoko-Mrontoh stool brought this action in a representative capacity in the New Juaben Native Court "A", Koforidua, seeking to set aside the sale of 1938 and to recover possession of the said land, on the ground that the sale to defendant was "contrary to native"customary law" in that all the principal elders and members of the Ayoko-Mrontoh stool did not sign the document of transfer.In the course of the trial in the native court the plaintiff tendered certain destoolment proceedings with a view to making use of the evidence of some witnesses who testified during the destoolment enquiry, but who were not called to give evidence in the instant case. The defendant objected to the proceedings going in, but his objection was overruled.The native court found that notwithstanding the absence of the signatures of some principal members of the Ayoko stool, the sale to defendant was valid and dismissed plaintiff's claim.The plaintiff appealed to the High Court, Accra. The main grounds argued were, in substance, (a) that the native trial court confused the distinction between stool property and stool family property, and therefore the customary law relating to the disposal of either, and (b) that since some of the admittedly principal members of the Ayoko stool did not sign the document of transfer, the sale should be held to be invalid.

Judgement

Appeal from a decision of the New Juaben Native Court "A", Koforidua, dismissing plaintiff's claim to set aside the sale of land and for recovery of possession.

This appeal is against a judgment of the New Juabeng Native Court "A", and is by the plaintiff-appellant who will be referred to shortly as the plaintiff, against the defendant-respondent who will be referred to shortly as the defendant. By his writ the plaintiff claimed as follows:

"plaintiff as occupant of Ayokoh-Mrontoh stool on behalf of himself, principal chiefs, elders and members of the stool family, claims from the defendant, recovery of possession of land situate lying and being at right of street leading to Omanhene's (New Juabenhene's) palace (Koforidua) which said land defendant alleges to have been sold to him by Yeboa Korie, former Ayokohene and Opanyin Kofi Teng, Wirempehene of Mrontoh (deceased) which said sale of the said land is contrary to native customary law."

The concluding and operative part of the judgment of the trial court in favour of the defendant was as follows:

"After hearing the parties and their witnesses and examination of all papers tendered in evidence by parties, the court finds that the plaintiff's only claim is whether the sale of the land was proper or constitutional; if not, it should be restored to the stool which he occupies. The main findings of the court are whether the sale was proper and constitutional or not. This court holds that any property of a stool sold by its occupant with the concurrence of his elder or elders and his linguist or linguists then is constitutional and proper. It finds that many senior members of the family witnessed the sale. According to plaintiff 's destoolment record tendered in evidence by him, one Kofi Teng was Krontihene of the Ayoko Mrontoh Division who said he was senior to Kofi Bruku (p.5 record); he was represented and signed the document, as well as Kofi Apoakwah and Okyeame Kwadjo Akuoko of the same Division. Judgment therefore entered for Defendant with costs."

The plaintiff appeals against the decision on the grounds set out in the additional grounds filed on his behalf on the 31st October, 1960. There are two matters to be dealt with at the out-set before entering upon the merits of the appeal. The first is the question whether the record of the plaintiff's destoolment proceedings which he tendered through his [p.36] first witness Mr. Hinson, former registrar of the court of the defunct Provincial Commissioner's Court and which was admitted against the defendant's objection as exhibit E, was rightly admitted. As to this I have no hesitation in holding that the depositions in that former enquiry were wrongly admitted in the action. The legal position is explained in the The Duchess of Kingston's case1 as follows:

"what has been said at the bar is certainly true, as a general principle, that a transaction between two parties, in judicial proceedings, ought not to be binding upon a third; for it would be unjust to bind any person who could not be admitted to make a defence, or to examine witnesses, or to appeal from a judgment he might think erroneous; and therefore the depositions of witnesses in another cause in proof of a fact, the verdict of a jury finding the fact, and the judgment of the court upon facts found, although evidence against the parties and all claiming under them, are not, in general, to be used to the prejudice of strangers".

Accordingly in the Privy Council case of Kobina Angu v. Cudjoe Attah2 Sir Arthur Channell also explained that:

"when a witness has sworn to certain matters in one action, the record of what he has so sworn cannot be used in another action as evidence of the facts which he has sworn to. This is so even when the second action is between the same parties as the first and a fortiori where it is not".

As was done therefore in Wudanu Kwasi v. Yaw Nkansah II3 where in respect of certain documents wrongly admitted, the West African Court of Appeal held that:

"In dealing therefore with the other main ground of appeal we have excluded from our consideration the proceedings and the so-called award and the three letters referred to. . ."

The plaintiff's destoolment proceedings (exhibit E) have to be completely excluded when the evidence of the parties is considered. The second matter is the nature of the property, the subject-matter of the action. Its description in the notice of warning issued on the 4th June, 1938, about the time of the sale-a notice which was obviously issued and sent out with the knowledge and connivance of the plaintiff, since in his evidence-in-chief he said concerning the same: "We warned the defendant not to buy it [the property] by letter". The plot of land, the subject-matter of the action was described as: "Property belonging to the Ayoko Mrontoh stool [of] which the present occupant is Barima Yeboa Koree." Moreover it was claimed in that letter that the property could not be sold and/or purchased "without the written consent of the whole elders of the Ayoko Mrontoh Division". Further, in the plaintiff 's evidence in respect of those whose consent and/or concurrence was necessary for the alienation of the said property, he said as follows: "The principal members are Jasehene; Sanahene; Akyeamehene; Opanyin Boampong, successor to Kwabena Beng and Kwesi Adjei; Kwame Anyimadu as Head of Youngmen; and Kofi Teng, Krontihene". It appears clear therefore that although the property was, during the course of the trial, sometimes referred to as [p.37] "Mrontoh family stool property", it was not stool family property in the sense of belonging to the chief's immediate stool family. It was not "stool family land" as was the subject-matter of the reported case Yaw Akyirefie v. The Paramount Stool of Breman-Esiam per Nana Kwa Bom III4, from the headnote of which it emerged that:

"The evidence in the native Court established that the occupant of the paramount Stool of Breman-Esiam is elected from the Nsona Stool family. The claim was, in effect a claim by and on behalf of the Nsona Stool family and not on behalf of the paramount Stool."

In that case, therefore, it was held that two certain members of the panel of the trial native court who were complained of as disqualified by interest from participating in the trial, "although connected with the paramount Stool, had no personal interest in the land of the Stool family, on whose behalf the suit was really instituted. Accordingly they were not debarred from sitting on the Native Court."

Coussey, J. in the course of the judgment in that case said as follows:

"The evidence establishes that the Nsona Stool family is the family from which the occupant of the paramount Stool of Breman-Esiam is elected and that the family is composed of three sections, each with its abusuapenin or head. The land of the family is Stool family land and, according to well-known principles of native customary law, it may be farmed upon and used by members of the family so far as they do not interfere with the occupation of other members under the direction of the senior head of the three sections."5

The land in this case is beyond question stool property in the fullest and truest sense of the term and of the type of which Sir John Verity, C.J. (Nigeria) spoke in the Nigerian case of Oyekan v. Adele6 when he said as follows:

".it appears to be beyond doubt that it falls within that class of estate which has been variously described as 'Stool land' (a term more commonly used in the Gold Coast than in Nigeria) or 'royal estates' and the nature of the interest vested in the King . . . has been the subject of judicial pronouncement. In Quarm v. Yankah II (1 W.A.C.A. 80) Deane, J. C., referring to Stool lands in the Gold Coast said:

'the conception of the Stool that is and has always been accepted in the Courts of this Colony is that it is an entity which never dies, a corporation sole like the Crown, and that while the occupants of the Stool may come and go the Stool goes on for ever.'

From this it may be deduced that land vested in the ruler as such is not vested in him beneficially or as absolute owner but solely in him in his office, and indeed, prior to Sir George Deane's observation to which I have referred, Lord Haldane in Amodu Tijani v. Secretary of Southern Nigeria [1921] 2 A.C. 399 at p.410, observed:-

'Their Lordships doubt whether any really definite distinction is connoted by the expression 'stool lands'. It probably means little more than lands which the Chief holds in his representative or constitutional capacity, as distinguished from land which he and his own family hold individually'. [p.38]

It would appear therefore that the estate or interest vested in the ruler in royal estates or "stool land' is to be distinguished on the one hand from land vested in him beneficially as absolute owner alienable by him at will and on the other hand land vested in himself and his family beneficially and of which the Chief or head of the family is sometimes referred to as a 'trustee'.

We turn now to the merits of the appeal. Learned counsel, in so far as the grounds appearing in the additional grounds filed are concerned, commenced with ground two which was that:

"The trial Court was wrong in failing to in make a distinction between the purely domestic affairs of the Ayoko Stool and the political affairs of the Stool".

It will be observed, however, that the difference between that and ground one, as follows:

"The trial Native Court was wrong in failing to make a distinction between the customary law relating to the disposal of family stool land and that relating to the disposal of town or state stool land,"

is negligible, and the two grounds were, in substance, the same. They certainly were argued as one, and when elaborating on them learned counsel submitted as follows:

"It may be said that in Akyem Abuakwa the signatures of the Okyenhene and his Linguist are sufficient. But this is a family property and there is an obvious difference. That is what I have tried to set out in Ground 2. In a family sale it is the concern of the members of the family. The main point is that there was no meeting of the elders to discuss and agree on the sale at all. All the elders say they knew nothing about it. I refer to Kojo Kwan v. Kwesi Nyeni [1959] G.L.R. 67.

The evidence that Krontihene, Sanahene etc, are principal members is not challenged. The Plaintiff says if those had signed he would not have challenged the document. I submit Plaintiff has established his claim".

As to the above submissions, the first decisive matter is that the property, the subject-matter of the action, having been demonstrated conclusively and indisputably to be stool property stricto sensu, it seems to me, with due deference to able counsel, that his grounds one and two, and the arguments and submission on them were substantially misconceived. The trial court was not called upon to draw any such distinction as is mentioned by him in his grounds one and two having regard to the evidence as to the character and nature of the property, the subject-matter of the action, which was available to the members of the trial court, and they quite properly made no attempt to draw any such distinction. They were dealing with "stool property" in the truest sense of the term, and considering how that is validly alienable according to customary law; in my opinion they dealt with the action purely and properly, on that footing.

But more important, speaking for myself, I am not aware that there is any very marked difference or distinction recognised by customary law in the manner or mode of alienation of "communal property"-be the community a private family unit, or a broader unit or group constituting a division of a state or the whole state itself. There is no need I think, to point out that the term "family", which can be, and is used even in respect of the association of nations-e.g. "the Family of United Nations"-is applicable to any form of grouping whatsoever. But for our purposes, [p.39] whatever the group or unit, surely the important thing is that the proposal to alienate or dispose of communal property vested in and held by the head for and on behalf of the community, be he the head of a family, or of a village or town, or of a division or state, must be brought to the knowledge of the community and their assent thereto obtained. The most common and usual way is by convening a meeting of the members of the community at which the proposal is submitted for discussion; but obviously there must be, and there are, other means, having regard to the circumstances of each community and each particular case. Hayes Redwar in his invaluable Comments on Some Ordinances of the Gold Coast Colony (1909) at p. 75 has said:

"As [the Head] has no exclusive but only a joint ownership with the rest of the Community, he must call a meeting of the members, and discuss with them any dealing with the property of the Community, which may be necessary or expedient in their interests, and obtain their consent to it before anything can be done. This consent seems to be usually given on behalf of the rest of the Family by the elders in the Family Council".

Once the assent to alienate has been obtained, the actual execution of a document may be left to and may be effected by a few representatives.

The learned judge and author continues, at pp.76-77:

"It follows, from the circumstances that the question whether any estate or interest passes in any such transaction must, from the nature of the case, depend on the right to convey by Native Law, that care should be taken, not necessarily that all persons interested should execute a conveyance, but that evidence should be given of the necessary consents required by Native Law having been obtained ... Although a conveyance may have been executed only by the Head of the Family, or the Chief to whose stool the land is attached, this conveyance may be held perfectly valid, if satisfactory evidence be given that the consent of all necessary parties has been in fact obtained although they have not executed the conveyance or have not been expressed to be parties to it".

In the case of Quarm v. Yankah II7 which dealt with stool property, as in this case, Sir George Deane, C.J. adopted a statement of customary usage made by Sarbah in his Fanti Customary Laws (2nd. ed.) at p. 67 that:?-

"A person who desires to procure a grant of land or any other concession from a local ruler, should make special inquiries and inform himself who the members of his council are, and get them, or the linguist of the council to join the head chief in making such grant".

and then went on to express the view that:?-

"It is clear, therefore, that in the opinion of the learned author, it is sufficient for the linguist of the Council alone to sign in lieu of the Elders and Councillors in order to bind the Stool-a rule that appears to me so useful and reasonable that I think this Court should even if there were no good authority for it, lay it down so as to put an end to the uncertainty that seems to be prevalent about this matter. For if in English law a great corporation controlling millions of money and representing thousands of shareholders can be bound by the signature of its chairman or secretary accompanied by the affixing of its seal, it seems to me most reasonable that the consent of an unwieldy body like the Chief, his Elders and Councillors of a petty community should be expressed by the signatures of the Chief and the Linguist who is recognised by native custom as the mouth-piece [p.40] of the Stool, and that a purchaser should not be oppressed by the spectre of a couple of councillors turning up to complain that they were never consulted and claiming on that account to set aside a contract for which he has in good faith, paid valuable consideration".

This expression of view by the learned Chief Justice soon began to be interpreted as amounting to an enunciation of a proposition of customary law that it is enough or sufficient for a chief and his linguist only to effect or make a transaction to bind the stool. But it appears that that misinterpretation?-for it was nothing less than that ?-proceeded upon a confusion as to the matter to which the concurrence or consent required by customary law relates, namely, the proposal to alienate or dispose of the communal property on the one hand, or the execution of a document or instrument effecting the alienation or transfer of the property on the other hand. The concurrence or consent of the linguist of a chief alone to the latter's proposal to alienate or dispose of stool property, cannot have the effect in custom and usage of giving the chief valid authority and/or power to alienate or dispose of stool land. He must have in effect the collective assent or approval of his elders and councillors to alienate, as far as this collective assent is capable of being given or expressed in the customary way. It is when that collective assent has been given that, very often, the linguist, the mouth-piece of the elders and councillors, is detailed to give expression to it by joining the chief to sign and/or execute a document or instrument of transfer, and then of course such an instrument so signed by the linguist alone, in addition to the chief, becomes perfectly valid. That is the true meaning and significance of Sir George Deane's expression of views?-not, as it has often been misinterpreted, that a chief and his linguist alone can by custom, alienate stool property to bind the stool. So in Suit No. 38/49, Isaac Collins Hayford v. Kwami Ntsin and 4 ors. as representing the Stool of Effia8 in which the question for determination was whether a loan transaction between the plaintiff as lender and the occupant of the stool of Effia together with his chief linguist and three other elders as borrowers, which transaction was evidenced by a promissory note bearing the signatures by marks of the chief, his linguist and those three elders was binding on the stool, in the course of the trial of which suit counsel for the plaintiff expressed the utmost reliance on the case of Quarm v. Yankah II9 and contended that "the chief and his linguist can bind the stool", Ragnar Hyne, J. in his judgment observed as follows:

"Learned Counsel for the plaintiff places great reliance on the case of Quarm v. Yankah II, 1 W.A.C.A. 80 and he lays great stress on the words of Deane, C.J. at page 84, where the Learned Chief Justice says the signatures of the chief and linguist are binding on the stool. Counsel however appears to have overlooked the fact that the Learned Chief Justice, as I understand him, only regards the chief and linguist as competent to sign when the consents required by native custom have been given. The fact that the chief and his linguist signed Exhibit "A" [the promissory note] in this case may lead to a presumption that the necessary consents had been given but it is a presumption which may be rebutted and in my view such a presumption has been completely rebutted in this case. The signature of Brompong Yaw and his linguist cannot therefore be regarded as binding on the Stool". [p.41]

When the case subsequently came on appeal before the West African Court of Appeal as Civil Appeal No. 4/1950 Isaac Collins Hayford v. Kwami Ntsin and 4 ors10 firstly Sir Mark Wilson, C.J. (President) had this to say:-

"The actual question in issue is whether the customary formalities necessary to bind the Stool of Effia and make it liable for this debt were carried out. The appellant claims that the Stool is bound because the names of the Chief, Brompong Yaw II, and that of Wusu Kwamina, who is shown by the evidence to be the Linguist of the Stool, appear on the document. The 1st respondent, who is the present caretaker of the Stool, denies liability on the ground that the consent of the Stool family was not obtained to the raising of the loan.... The learned trial Judge took the view that . . . the Stool [was not] liable because the consent of the stool family, which he held to be necessary, had not been obtained...

"As to whether the stool, of which the 1st respondent is the present representative is liable, I agree with the learned trial Judge's decision that it is not, but for different reasons. I can see no grounds in law for holding that the consent of the Stool family is necessary to bind a Stool like the Effia Stool which comprises many other people as well as the members of the immediate Stool family which forms the core of the Stool community and is its active element for such purposes as enstoolment and destoolment, but not for ordinary business transactions.

"In this connection there has been quoted to us the opinion expressed by Deane, C.J. in Quarm v. Yankah II Ors, 1 W.A.C.A., 80 as to the conditions in which a Stool is bound by a document purporting to be executed by its representatives".

The opinion of Deane C.J. already set out earlier in this judgment was quoted by Wilson C.J., who then proceeded:

"At first sight it might seem that this passage laid it down as an absolute proposition of native customary law that any document signed by a Chief and his linguist is ipso facto binding on the Stool. I do not think the opinion goes as far as that. The approval previously expressed of Sarbah's requirement that special enquiries should be made as to the personnel of the Council, the use of the expressions 'linguist of the Council and 'the mouthpiece of the Stool' coupled with the subsequent passage in the judgment (at p. 84) which refers with approval to the very full precautions taken by the solicitor in the case to ensure that those signing the document there in question were acting in good faith as representatives of the Stool, all seem to involve some modification of the absolute nature of the learned Chief Justice's statement of the law contained in the first sentence of the passage quoted above and do not justify any extreme interpretation of its terms. The statement does not seem to me to be inconsistent with the view that although in general the signature on a document by the Chief and the Linguist signing in their official capacities raises a presumption of validity, in a particular case it is open to the adverse party to prove by evidence that the customary consents required by native law have not in fact accompanied the execution of the document".

Next Lewey J.A., said as follows:

"First, as to the judgment of Sir George Deane, C.J. in Quarm v. Yankah II: it seems to me most important that the judgment should not be regarded as an authority for the proposition that a Stool is to be bound by a document merely because it bears the signature of the Chief and the Linguist, and without regard being had to any other matters. The trial judge in the present case took the view that when Sir George Deane pronounced the Chief and Linguist competent to bind the Stool by their signatures in lieu of the signatures of the Elders and Councillors he had already satisfied himself that the consents required by native custom had been given. I am myself very strongly of that opinion, and I think that the judgment [p.42] in Quarm v. Yankah II should be read, and should always be applied, subject to that qualification. There are several passages in the judgment which to my mind, support such a construction".

Finally Coussey J., the third member of the court said as follows:

"Prima facie, if it were proved that Ohene Brompong Yaw II and Wusu Kwamina, who is admittedly the Linguist of the Stool, received the loan and signed the receipt on which the plaintiff sues for and on behalf of the Stool and with the consent of the Councillors and others ultimately liable to repay the loan then on the authority of Quarm v. Yankah II and Ors. 1 W.A.C.A. 80 the Stool would, in my opinion, be bound.

Such being therefore the true customary position, let us now examine the facts disclosed by the evidence in this case, in the light of that customary position.

(His lordship then reviewed the evidence in detail and continued.] The case therefore differs radically from the usual case where the proposal to alienate stool land emanates from the chief and he has to seek and take steps to obtain the assent of the community. In this case it appears that it was an instance of a community (the Ayoko Mrontoh division) against which judgment had been obtained through its stool, or stool occupant, or representative, taking a decision that instead of the chief continuing further possibly fruitless litigation, communal property should be sold and the proceeds applied towards liquidation and satisfaction of the judgment debt, and the chief being requested to take the necessary steps to implement that decision. Details of how the decision was taken are not available in the evidence, but Asante, the registrar, stated: "I took the thumb-prints of the principal members of the family who asked him to sell the land". In this connection it should be remembered that the gravamen of the plaintiff's complaint was that Bruku and Kwabena Beng who were also principal elders had not been consulted. It is to be specially observed that this was at a time when there had been a change in the holder of the office of Ayokohene, the plaintiff who was formerly holding the office having been destooled and Yeboa Korie, second witness for defendant, having been enstooled in his stead. The inevitable result would be the subsistence of a certain amount of divided loyalties among the members of the family or community. Those relatives and adherents to the former chief would tend to be passive, probably for the time being temporarily withdrawn from active administration of the day-to-day affairs of the community, so that even when meetings are called, although they are quite well aware of them, they have no inclination to attend. In such a state of things, can it be said that if a decision is taken concerning any important matter affecting the whole community they are not bound? I cannot think so-and customary usage does not recognise that to be the position, otherwise no native administration could function constitutionally and legally after a change in the chieftaincy. The usual thing which happens is what may have happened in this case-namely one or two extra-staunch and loyal supporters of the destooled chief would tend to shun meetings of the council of elders, not because they do not know of them or are not invited to them, but through diffidence, fear of being called disloyal by the former chief and his immediate circle of friends, temporary shyness, shame at being on the losing side in the[p.43] political contest between the old and new chief, and/or divers other causes and reasons. It may be therefore that Kofi Bruku and Kwabena Beng were two elders who adopted such an attitude and kept away from meetings of the council of the new chief so that they did not join in taking the decision to sell in this case. But if in fact they did not join the other elders as I have said, just as they could not by their attitude and conduct paralyse the administration of the new chief, so they could not invalidate the decision of the council of elders. It is in this connection that the office and functions of the kyeame (or linguist) becomes significantly important. He represents the council of elders, those who actually attended the meeting and participated in taking a decision and those who for divers reasons did not attend the meeting, and joins with the chief to implement the council's decision to sell; and that is what I am satisfied from the evidence took place here, i.e. after a collective decision to dispose of the property and apply the proceeds towards satisfaction of the judgment debt against the stool represented by the then Ayokohene, when it came to the time for signing a document, the linguist, the representative of the council of elders was there to sign with the Ohene, but several others of the sub-chiefs and elders were also present to sign themselves.

In Quarm v. Yankah II11 supra, Sir George Deane was satisfied with, apart from the signatures of the Omanhene and his linguist, the signatures of: "Ephraim, who is proved to have been Chief Councillor . . . [and] two others one of whom is said to be a councillor and the other an elder". It appears to me therefore that the document of transfer in this case (exhibit J) bearing, apart from the signatures of the Krontihene by his nephew and representative, the acting Gyasehene, Kofi Apoakwah (Akonfodihene), and five other elders (and in this respect it should be borne in mind that there was evidence from the defendant's side that they were elders, which the trial court accepted, for the court refers to all of them as "Senior Members") is, a fortiori unimpeachable. The trial court's decision was: "It finds that many senior members of the family witnessed the sale". I am satisfied that that finding is amply borne out by the evidence and justifies the trial court's decision in favour of the defendant.

[His lordship then considered the question of laches and concluded:]

Even if the concurrence and consent of certain elders was necessary to validate the sale to the defendant, those elders have not availed themselves of their right to challenge the sale timeously enough, and it is now, a period of about twenty years from June, 1938, to about June, 1958, much too late for their claim to be entertained. On that further ground, which was not considered by the trial court, I am satisfied the judgment in favour of the defendant-respondent is correct and I accordingly confirm and uphold the same and dismiss the appeal with costs.

Decision

<P>Appeal dismissed.</P>

Plaintiff / Appellant

E. N. Moore for W. Ofori Atta

Defendant / Respondent

J. O. Dadey

Referals

(1) The Duchess of Kingston's case, (1776) 34 H.L.J.655; 20 Howell St. Tr. 537; Smith's Leading Cases, (13th ed.) Vol. 2, p.644

(2) Kobina Angu v. Cudjoe Attah (1916) P.C. '74-'28, 43

(3) Kwasi v. Yaw Nkansah II (1948) 12 W.A.C.A. 303

(4) Yaw Akyirefie v. The Paramount Stool of Breman-Esiam (1951) 13 W.A.C.A. 331

(5) Oyekan v. Adele (1952) 14 W.A.C.A. 209

(6) Quarm v. Yankah II (1930) 1 W.A.C.A. 80

(7) Hayford v. Ntsin, Divisional Court, Sekondi, November 16, 1949, unreported.

(8) Hayford  v. Ntsin, W.A.C.A., March 16, 1951, unreported.

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